LKIF Core, version 1.1, copyright (C) 2008, the ESTRELLA consortium
Partner contributions from the University of Amsterdam (UvA), the University of Bologna (UNIBO) and the Fraunhofer institute (FOKUS). Editor: Rinke Hoekstra (UvA) Authors: Rinke Hoekstra (UvA), Alexander Boer (UvA), Kasper van den Berg (UvA) Contributors: Joost Breuker (UvA), Rosella Rubino (UNIBO), Thomas Gordon (FOKUS)
The LKIF-Core ontology, version 1.0, is part of Deliverable 1.4 of the European project for Standardised Transparent Representations in order to Extend Legal Accessibility (ESTRELLA, IST-2004-027665), http://www.estrellaproject.org The use of this ontology, and the OWL files through which it is distributed, is covered by the GNU Lesser General Public License (LGPL), version 2.1 (http://www.gnu.org/copyleft/lesser.html) in as far as the copyright is not covered by additional restrictions of the ESTRELLA consortium agreement (info@estrellaproject.org). The LGPL license places copyright restrictions on the ontology itself but does not apply these restrictions to software that merely links with concepts defined in the ontology library. Please read the license restrictions before using this work.
This file defines a number of types of what is commonly called a propositional attitude (PA). These relate propositional content to the proposition expressing the content. A subdivision of the propositional attitudes are the mental attitudes (see e.g. Cugola, 1996), types of propositions in the mind. Another category is the PA of an act of communication.
This module is part of LKIF-Core, version 1.1, part of Deliverable 1.4 of ESTRELLA, IST-2004-027665
Allows for expressing the relation between a communicated attitude and the Agent to which the communication act is addressed
Relates an expression being asserted to the assertion
Relates an assertion to the expression being asserted
Relates a proposition to the attitude held towards it
Relates an expression to the author of the expression (e.g. for expressions contained in documents)
A Medium 'bears' or carries expressions.
Relates a belief to the agent holding the belief
Relates an agent to the belief(s) it holds
Relates a declared expression to the attitude to the declaration
Relates a declaration to the expression being declared
Expresses whether some thing is evaluatively comparable to some other thing.
Relates a propositional attitude to the agent holding the attitude
Relates an agent to the propositional attitude it holds
Specifies that some intention is held by some agent
Specifies that the agent holds some intention
Relates an expression to the medium it is beared in (i.e. for extentional propositions)
Relates a believed observation to the agent observing it
Relates an agent to the thing it beliefs it observes
Relates an expression to the promise over the expression
Relates a promise to the expression being promised
Relates something which is qualified to the attitude or qualification qualifying it
Relates an evaluative attitude or qualification to the proposition or thing being qualified
A towards relation between a propositional attitude and a proposition expresses that the attitude is held towards that proposition. Qualification of the proposition can be either true or false, i.e. the attitude denotes whether the proposition is either true or false.
Relates an utterance (communicated propositional attitude) to its utterer
NOTE (OWL 1.1) the action may actually be 'part of' the intention of the agent, that is: intends some (expression:Intention and Self)
NOTE: question remains whether some observation is also a *requirement* of the reaction. Furthermore, the current definition ensures that the observed action becomes a top:Mental_Object (i.e. it is internalised).
An argument is a reason that is expressed through some medium
The assertion is subject to a fit between words and world, in Searle's terms. It's propositional content can be true of false. If it is inconsistent with other assertions, beliefs, observations, it may come to be considered false.
proposes something that usually is the case, although there is no specific evidence that it is true in this particular case
Someting an agent 'believes in', i.e. holds as true
A cause is an epistemic role played by something which is the outcome of a (chain) of processes
A communictated attitude is a propositional attitude involved in an act of communication.
Searle: the successful performance of a declaration is sufficient to bring about the fit between words and world, to make the propositional content true. In other words, if there is an inconsistency between the declaration and assertions, beliefs, or observations, it is not the declaration that is false. True of definitions and norms, and several other performative statements by legislators.
A Document bears some (and only) expression(s) stated by some statement in writing.
An evaluative attitude expresses e.g. a judgment. The proposition qualified by the evaluative attitude is comparable to something else.
Some thing which is evaluatively qualified, i.e. an evaluation applies to the proposition, the proposition is judged. The proposition is comparable to some other proposition.
Observation and/or statement, used as a backing for a belief. Evidence is the role of observation which is qualified by some belief.
An exception is something that is excluded from a general statement or does not follow a rule. In LKIF rules, an exception is a rule which has an exception relation to another rule (cf. Deliverable 1.1)
An expectation is a predictive belief held on purely logical grounds, i.e. not based on direct external evidence, like an observation or a statement by another agent. It is also often characterized as a "belief about the future", but this isn't very helpful since one may also hold expectations about the (yet unknown) past. The theory of evolution is for instance a fertile ground for predictions about the existence of past species, and therefore at the same a predictor of future observations.
Is not only not an observation by itself, but also the thing being expected cannot be an observation in any sense
An expression is a proposition beared by some medium, e.g. a document, and is stated by some communicated attitude
A fact is a proposition (about something) which is (commonly) agreed upon to hold as true: it has some backing in evidence
Intention is where the agent expects certain consequences of his or her actions and desires those consequences to occur. This concept must be related to qualification and preference in some way.
An assertion that is inconsistent with the beliefs of the speaker. It is *intentionally* false.
A medium is a bearer of expressions, i.e. externalised propositions. Propositions become expressions once they are externalised through some medium.
An observation is the role played by some proposition believed to be true or false through observation of an agent.
A problem is an observation that deviates from an Intention.
NOTE: This currently cannot be expressed: OWL DL does not support negation of properties. The definition will be further elaborated once OWL 1.1 is supported by development tools.
A promise is a communicated attitude about some future action or state
A (non logical) proposition is a proposition qualified by a propositional attitude. NB: The proposition used here does not correspond to a proposition in proposition logics.
NOTE: In previous versions of this ontology, this class was called 'Qualified'. In lieu of the separation between Proposition and Propositional_Attitude, the intended meaning of that class has been moved to 'Evaluative_Proposition'
A propositional attitude connects a person (the holder of the attitude) to some proposition, in fact it expresses some qualification over the proposition. Distinguishing a proposition from the propositional content expressed by it is necessary when properties relating to the thing expressed and properties of the expression itself must be distinguished. For LKIF the distinction between Belief, Intention, Qualification, and Observation is relevant. The distinction between belief/expectation, intention, and observation is relevant for i.a. establishing mens rea (guilty mind). The distinction between beliefs (expressing the content of the mind of an agent) and statements (expressing the content of an act of communication by an agent) is classical.
A qualification expresses e.g. a judgment. The thing qualified by the qualification is comparable to something else.
Something that is qualified by some qualification
A speech act (or illocutionary act) creates some propositional attitude which qualifies an expression (which by default is mediated through some medium). The actor of the speech act is the utterer of the atitude (NB cannot be expressed in OWL DL).
Not to be confused with the actual writing/document itself, which is the medium of the statement.
A surprise is an observation that deviates from an expectation.